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HUMAN RIGHTS AND POLICY WRONGS

UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT IN
THE CREATION AND OVERTHROW OF THE SOMOZA REGIME

Kevin A. Katovich
Honors Research Project
Under the Direction of W. Michael weis
10 May 1993
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On the morning of January 10, 1978, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro,
the chief opponent to the government of Nicaraguan President
Anastasio Garcia Somoza, began his usual drive through the
streets of Managua, still ravished from an enormous earthquake
six years earlier.

SUddenly, a green pickup truck obstructed the

path of his Saab, and forced Chamorro to the curb of the road.'
Three gunmen then jumped out of the truck, carrying a machine gun
and a rifle and proceeded to fire eighteen shots into the car at
point-blank range, pummelling Chamorro. 2

This incident resulted

in a watershed for American Foreign policy towards Nicaragua.
Anthony Lake, Director of Policy Planning in the united states
Department of State under President Jimmy carter, stated that
after Chamorrp's death, "Nicaragua began to emerge from the ranks
of small Central American nations with whose dictators the Carter
administration had an uncomfortable, ambiguous

relationship.~,3

Looking back on the situation, questions remain.

Why, under

Carter, did the united States initially support Somoza, a man
notorious for human rights abuses?

Furthermore, what events

caused a change in policy, toward Nicaragua, and how real was
that change?

The events in Nicaragua between 1977-1979, indicate

that the Carter Administration based its foreign policy, not on a
new approach, human rights, but rather on an old obsession -
order and stability.

This obsession can also be seen in u.S.

policy toward Nicaragua in the early part of the century.

While

some Carter Administration officials concerned themselves more
with issues of human rights, and democracy, they clashed, with

2

those more concerned with order, stability, protection of u.s.
property, and communism.

This struggle proved detrimental to the

administration's policy toward Nicaragua.
In recent years there have been many works pUblished on the
Sandinistas and the fall of the Somoza dynasty.
on the change in u.s. policy toward Nicaragua.

Few works center
Two stand out:

Condemned to Repetition, by Robert Pastor, and Lake's Somoza
Falling.

Pastor served as a policy expert toward Nicaragua for

the National security council, (NSC) under carter. 4

These books

do not delve deeply into the ironies and contradictions of the
Carter Administration's foreign policy (due probably to their
close association with the administration).

Furthermore, they do

not look into the early history of Nicaragua, in particular, the
rise to power of the Somoza dynasty.

It remains crucial to look

at the u.s. foreign policy toward Nicaragua not only for
understanding the current situation in that country, but also to
gain insight on foreign policy in general.

But, in order to

understand fully the circumstances surrounding the Carter
Administration's policy vis-a-vis Nicaragua, one must consider
the ascent of the Somoza dynasty.5

THE EARLY YEARS - 1823-1927 CIVIL WAR AND THE ENTRANCE OP THE
UNITED STATES

The united states' entrance into Nicaragua began in 1848.
At this time the British maintained a foothold in the country,
around the Mosquito Coast.
California.

In 1848 miners discovered gold in

This in turn created a u.s. desire to secure
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transportation routes across Central America to the Pacific
Coast.

The subsequent desire led in 1850 to the Clayton-Bulwer

treaty, which assured that any canal or railroad across the
Central American isthmus would be under joint u.s. and British
control. 6
In 1855, William Walker went to Nicaragua at the request of
the Liberals, and helped to defeat the Conservative government.
He proceeded to name himself president, legalize slavery, and
make English the official language.

To Nicaraguans, Walker

embodied everything hated about the United states.
never forgot the "invasion" of Walker. 7

Nicaragua

For the next thirty-six

years, the Conservatives controlled Nicaragua.
stability, of sorts, sYmbolized the early years of the
Conservative reign.

The Conservatives constructed railroads,

began operating gold mines, and attracted European immigrants
into the country.

Most importantly for the economy, an agrarian

reform took place which expanded coffee production, and
introduced bananas. 8
Prosperity increased United states interest in Nicaragua.
North American banana growers (led by the Standard Fruit Company,
and united Fruit Company) began to lay the foundations which
eventually led to their notorious domination in the twentieth
century.

In addition, the building of the Panama Canal made

Nicaragua important to u.s. interests, as the only alternative
canal route. 9
Fear over U.S. expansion through the region, prompted
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Liberal General, Jose Santos Zelaya to oust the Conservatives
from power in 1893. 10

Zelaya ruled for the next sixteen years,

often at odds with the United States.

Zelaya firmly believed in

Central American union, a type of United States of Central
America, and saw the U.S. as an immediate threat to his
interests. 11
The less-than-amicable relations continued.

By the end of

the nineteenth century, Zelaya began to turn his regime into an
open dictatorship, and began to modernize his armed forces. 12
In addition to repression, Zelaya perpetuated his reign through
rigged elections.

He promised elections, and delivered, though

according to one account, "voters were once given their choice of
three candidates, 'Jose, Santos, or Zelaya.

",13

By 1900, it

became clear to U.S. policy makers that only force could remove
Zelaya from power.
Nicaraguans assumed that the united States would build a
canal in their country.

Thus, in 1902 when the U.S. decided on

Panama as the canal site, Nicaragua suffered a major setback.
U.S. - Nicaraguan relations continued to decline rapidly.
turned to the Japanese to build a canal.

Zelaya

In addition, Zelaya

started canceling U.S. concessions in the country, and began to
turn to countries such as Great Britain for loans.

When in 1907

Nicaragua attacked Honduras and began to display its desire to be
a major actor in Central America, the United States decided to
remove Zelaya. 14
In October of 1909, Juan J. Estrada, the military Commander

•
•
•
•
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at Bluefields, led four-hundred Conservatives into revolution
against Zelaya and the Liberals. 15

The United states under

President Theodore Roosevelt, responded by sending four hundred
U.s. Marines into the region. 16

Zelaya managed to seal his own

fate in the revolution by capturing and executing two American
citizens who Estrada had hired to set mines and blow up Zelaya's
troopships.

The executions of American citizens, "gave the

united states the excuse it wanted to break openly with the
Zelaya regime. ,,17

The U. s. broke off all diplomatic relations

with Zelaya and on August 20, 1910, Juan Estrada who was
immediately recognized by the U.s., took over the reigns of
Nicaragua, and Adolfo Diaz became Vice-President. 18
Estrada pursued a policy which weakened rather than
strengthened his hold on the government.
centers of power:

He created three

The Ministry of War, headed by General Luiz

Mena, The Ministry of the Interior, headed by Jose Maria Moncada,
and Leadership of the Assembly, which went to Emiliano Chamorro.
Estrada intended these positions as rewards for his top aides,
but in reality this caused a struggle for power. 19
Realizing his power base weakened, Estrada began to
eliminate his opposition.

He limited the power of the Assembly,

and drove Chamorro into exile.

Estrada then pursued a course

which affected all aspects of Nicaraguan life through the
twentieth century.
To curtail War Minister Mena's (his chief rival) power,
Estrada approached the United states with a plan to transform the

•
•
•
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Army into an "'apolitical' force trained and organized by
American military advisors. ,,20

Before these plans could be

I

implemented, however, Mena's officers staged a coup, and forced
Estrada to resign.

Adolfo Diaz became president, and accepted

the American proposal to implement Estrada's plan of reorganizing
the army.

The plan called for "the creation of 'a small

disciplined regular armed force, American Army officers to be the
instructors.'"

This became the first

u.s.

attempt to reorganize

the Nicaraguan Military.Z1
In 1912, General Luis Mena, secretary of War under Diaz,
launched an attack against Diaz.

Following a plea by Diaz, the

united states sent in Marines to Nicaragua for the purpose of
thwarting thi~ Liberal revolt. Z2

For the next twenty-two years,

u.s. Marines, remained in Nicaragua, essentially revoking
Nicaragua's Independence.

with the help of the Marines, Diaz

defeated Mena and assumed the presidency.
The presence of U.S. Marines in Nicaragua severely affected
the Nicaraguan military.

The assured security which American

forces provided led to the decline in not only the army's number,
but also in its ability.

The Conservative regimes of this period

depended upon American support for their survival, and the United
States used this dependence to greatly strengthen its political
and economic controls over the country.23
The U.S. profited from its dominance in Nicaragua.

The

Bryan-Chamorro Treaty of 1914, fulfilled a long time U.S.
objective of securing canal rights in Nicaragua.

In exchange for

•
•

7

$3 million, the u.s. gained exclusive rights to build a canal
through Nicaragua, as well as possession of the Corn Islands.
The u.s. began to employ "legal" means of ensuring dominance. 24
In 1917, with the united states' blessing, Emiliano Chamorro
became president.

During the same year, the Lansing Plan

solidified Nicaraguan dependence upon the United states. The
Lansing Plan bound Nicaragua economically, for it enabled the
state Department to force loans upon Nicaragua which benefitted
U. s. banking interests. 25
In 1923, Conservative Carlos Solorzano, became president,
while a Liberal, Juan Batista Sacasa assumed the Vice-Presidency.
Sacasa's faction included a former automobile salesman, and
toilet

inspe~tor,

Anastasio Somoza Garcia.

While in the United

States, Somoza proclaimed to have had a political conversion to
liberalism, and thus returned to aid Sacasa.

Somoza eventually

became the most influential figure in Nicaraguan history.26
The u.s. planned on withdrawing the Marines from Nicaragua
in 1925, but President Solorzano asked the u.s. to suspend those
plans, which the u.s. agreed to do.

In return, Solorzano agreed

to once again move forward with the plans to create a U.S.
trained National Guard.

In February 1925, the State Department

gave Nicaragua the blueprint of the plan which called for
replacing the entire armed forces of Nicaragua.

Placed in charge

of this Guard was ex-army officer, Major Calvin B. Carter.

with

Carter in place, the Marines left on August 4, 1925. 27
Just three weeks after the Marines left, a serious crisis

•
•
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erupted as Chamorro once again made a bid to lead a revolution.
At this time, the National Guard remained weak, and it appeared
that Solorzano might be defeated.

Chamorro demanded that he be

appointed Minister of War, and with the National Guard unable to
stop him, Solorzano conceded. 28

Although Solorzano remained

President, the real control of Nicaragua, "was now in the hands
of General Emil iano Chamorro. ,,29
The departure of the Marines exposed a major problem.

After

American military dominance between 1912-1924, "there had been
little change in Nicaragua.

It still remained a country

unprepared for democracy, with a penchant for revolution. ,,30
The United States withdrew the Marines, and in their place left a
very weak National Guard.
The U.S. made it clear that any Chamorro-headed government
would not be recognized.

However, on January 16, 1926, because

of "health" reasons, Solorzano resigned in favor of Chamorro. 31
In May of the same year, the Liberals launched yet another
attack, this time at the Eastern city of Bluefields, in which
they seized the governor, and looted an American-managed National
Bank.

Chamorro responded by sending in the National Guard, which

stopped the uprising. 32
The revolution continued to spread across Nicaragua.
Meanwhile, reports surfaced that Sacasa and the Liberals received
arms and soldiers from Mexico, much to the chagrin of the united
States.

Nicaragua was once again in a state of flUX, and as a

result the U.S. sent a new charge', Lawrence Denis to the scene.

•
•
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Denis believed that "Nicaragua was in for a cycle of revolutions
unless Chamorro agreed to a settlement acceptable to the
Liberals. "

The Marines returned to Nicaragua. 33

Two sides eventually emerged in the revolution.

The

Liberals insisted that Juan Batista Sacasa be president, while
the Conservatives, with u.s. support, favored Adolfo Diaz.

The

two sides met on the U.S.S. Denver where they reached only one
agreement.

As a result of this agreement, Chamorro resigned and

u.s. backed Adolfo Diaz replaced him as president.

The Liberals

countered by setting up a "Constitutional Government" of their
own, headed by Sacasa.

The country began to move towards

anarchy, and u.s. President Calvin Coolidge, and Secretary of
State Frank Kellog decided on full scale U.S. intervention.~
When the Marines left in 1925, the Nicaraguan National Guard
replaced them as peace keepers.
handle the country's revolution.

The Guard proved too weak to
The United states did not want

to send in the Marines again and looked for a viable alternative.
President Coolidge decided on sending Henry L. stimson to mediate
a peace settlement.

THE STIMSON MISSION

Henry L. Stimson, a Harvard Law School graduate, entered the
pUblic life as District Attorney in New York.

After an

unsuccessful run at governor of New York, he eventually served as
a Colonel in World War I.

In 1926, Stimson worked briefly in

South America mediating a dispute between Chile and Peru.

•
•
•II
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stimson now turned his attention to Nicaragua. 35

The New York

Times reported that "the designation of Mr. stimson is generally
interpreted as a 'super' representative in that country."
Although having little knowledge of Nicaragua, stimson
nonetheless embarked on his mission energetically.

The state

Department reported that the purpose of the mission was "to get
information • • • as to the entire situation in that country for
the use of this Government."

In addition, stimson had to follow

the policies of the U.S. which included the protection of
Americans, and safeguarding the Canal route and naval base rights
acquired by the United states through treaty.

In the eyes of the

United states, the Nicaraguan civil War directly threatened
American interests. 36
stimson arrived in mid-April, 1927.

His task centered on

determining who the rightful president according to the
Nicaraguan constitution was.

Besides this riddle, other aspects

such as humanitarian concerns, as well as the fact that the
planting season approached with important implications for
people's diets, and the nation's economy, made ending it quickly
an urgent matter.

coolidge gave stimson full power.

37

After conferring with both sides of the war, as well as the
pUblic, stimson quickly obtained an overview of the situation.
He found that "the military situation was one of deadlock.

Both

armies fought well on the defensive; neither possessed the
disciplined organization for effective continuous offensive
action."

stimson realized that without

U.s. assistance, the

•
•
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situation could never peacefully be resolved. To his surprise,
however, both sides sought American assistance in ending the
deadlock. 38
Stimson favored a U.S. supervised election in 1928 to end
the conflict.

He saw certain conditions necessary however, to

reach this end, and he now turned his attention to these pre
requisites.
obtained.

First of all, peace and general amnesty had to be
Second, in order to ensure this peace, a complete

disarmament of both sides had to happen.

Finally, the key to all

of this according to stimson, lay with the creation of a new and
impartial police force, "to take the place of the forces which
the government was in the habit of using to terrorize and control
elections. ,,39

This last condition shaped Nicaraguan history for

the next fifty years.
On April 22, Nicaraguan President Adolfo Diaz sent stimson
an outline of proposed peace plans.

The memorandum called for:

Immediate peace, and delivery of arms to the Americans: general
amnesty, and return of exiles, and confiscated land:
Participation in Diaz's cabinet by representative Liberals:
U.s. training of a Nicaraguan constabulary: U.s. supervision of
the 1928, and SUbsequent elections: and temporary continuance of
the U.S. Marines to enforce the plan.

The plan also called for

Diaz to remain president until the 1928 elections.

stimson

believed that "only through his remaining in office was an
immediate peace settlement possible."

Armed with Diaz's and thus

the Conservatives peace plan, stimson sought the Liberals'

•
•
•
•
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response. 40
stimson did not believe that Sacasa and the Liberals would
accept the peace plan.

He therefore decided to take a hard-ball

approach, notifying Sacasa that u.s. policy of supporting Diaz
was non-negotiable, and the only hope for Sacasa was to agree on
supervised elections in 1928. 41

Stimson knew that he had to

include the Liberals in the peace plan, but he also had to remain
stern, making them realize that they did not really have a
choice.

On April 30, Sacasa sent representatives to meet with

stimson aboard the u.s. ship preston. 42
Aboard the Preston, the Liberals agreed to several points.
They agreed to U.S. supervised elections.
u.s. zone of

~nfluence

They also recognized a

extending to Panama.

not to make any treaties with Mexico. 43

Finally, they agreed

However, as the New

York Times reported, although the name of President Diaz had· not
been brought up in peace discussions, the "continuance of
President Diaz in office will be a stumbling block in the way of
a successful outcome. ,,44
Indeed, the meetings ended because the Liberals told stimson
that they had progressed as far as they could without getting rid
of Diaz.

Ironically, the Liberals told stimson that Diaz

represented the most acceptable Conservative to them.
problem centered on pride and principle.

The

They fought him for

months, and to support Diaz now was impossible.

The

representatives informed Stimson that further negotiations must
take place with General Jose Maria Moncada's, Sacasa's Secretary

•
•
•
•
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of War, and field commander, and besides Sacasa, the most
important Liberal. 45
On May 4, stimson met with General Moncada at Tipitapa, a
small village on the river connecting Lake Managua with Lake
Nicaragua to discuss peace plans.

Moncada frankly admitted to

stimson that "neither he nor any Nicaraguan could, without the
help of the united states, end the war or pacify the country.
,,46

Although this was the case, Moncada still refused to

support Diaz.

stimson, however, informed Moncada that "the

retention of President Diaz during the remainder of his term is
regarded as essential to that plan and will be insisted upon. ,,47
Although he still did not support Diaz, Moncada agreed to
recommend that the Liberals stop fighting. 48

Finally, on May

12, 1927 stimson received a letter from Moncada, "signed by him
and by all of his chieftains except General Augusto Ceasar
Sandino formally agreeing to lay down their arms. • • " which
seemed to end the war49

The fact that Sandino refused to

surrender seemed inconsequential at the time.
stimson left Nicaragua on May 16, a jUbilant victor.

The

final truce which the state Department disclosed to the New York
Times called for the American supervision of Nicaraguan affairs,
including the organizing of a native police force.
the u.s. agreed to supervise the 1928 elections. 5o

In addition
stimson

reflected on his accomplishments by declaring that "The final
announcement of a settlement met with general demonstrations of
joy and satisfaction in Nicaragua. ,,51

stimson felt that he had

•
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done a noble thing.

He succeeded in ending the civil war and

attaining stability in Nicaragua.
Not everyone approved of the plan.

Ironically, at the

beginning of his mission, a New York Times editorial said that a
stimson settlement "would go far to silence criticism, and to
refute the charge, so widely echoed in South America •

that

the sending of our Marines to Nicaragua was a sinister
development of 'American Imperialism' ,,52

The stimson mission

merely revoked much of Nicaragua's independence because the U.S.
forced its will upon the country.

In addition, the Mission

marked a turning point in u.s. - Latin American relations,
because it began the precedent of the United states training
Latin

Americ~n

police forces.

For Stimson, the mission also

represented a turning point, as it led to him becoming Secretary
of State.

In the end, stimson's mission failed to even produce

lasting peace, because although civil war had ended, guerilla
warfare soon began.
THE REBEL - AUGUSTO CEASAR SANDINO

Following the departure of stimson, Augusto Ceasar Sandino
launched a revolution that lasted for six years.

Sandino's goal

centered on the expulsion of the United states from Nicaragua.
Sandino fled to the mountains to hide, and began his war.
The six year conflict between Sandino and the National Guard
commenced on July 16, 1927. 53

On this date Sandino attacked the

Guard at the city of Ocotal.

Although the Guard easily crushed

Sandino and forced him back into the mountains, this conflict

•
•
•
•
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marked a watershed for Sandino's forces.

Sandino learned that he

had to use ambushes and sudden raids to be effective.

From this

point on in the war, Sandino only attacked "when the odds were
heavily in his favor - when he clearly had the advantaged of
surprise, cover, and superior firepower. ,,54

In essence, this

marked the beginning not only of guerilla war, but also of the
Sandinistas.
By the end of 1927, the ordeal of capturing Sandino began to
embarrass the u.s.

In China, an army unit had been named after

him, and in Moscow he received praise.

In the united states,

(just as Che Guevera would be in the Sixties) Sandino became a
hero of the Left.

The Americans decided to launch a major strike

against "El C~ipote," Sandino' s base in the mountains. 55
Following wave after wave of U.S. air strikes, a united
ground force consisting of the National Guard, and united states
Marines set out for El Chipote.

When the forces arrived, Sandino

was long gone, reportedly fifty miles away.56

Just as in

vietnam almost forty years later, the united states began to
realize the difficulties in waging a war against guerrillas who
enjoyed the popular support of local peasants.
Following the Nicaraguan election of Jose Moncada in 1928,
U.S. policy began to change.

At this time the united states

embarked on a plan to replace the Marines with the National Guard
as quickly as possible. 57

The "Nicaraguaisation" of the war now

began.
Sandino, meanwhile, concocted a plan for a coup in

•
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Nicaragua.

He wrote to other Latin American heads of state

informing them of his plans.

In addition, Sandino requested a

loan from Mexico to which ends he went to that country to meet
with its government.

However, upon arrival in Mexico, he

discovered that at the instruction of the united states, Mexico
had double-crossed him.

Sandino remained isolated in Mexico, not

meeting with the President for months.
the Mexican government refused to help.

When the two finally met,
The U.S. reported

Sandino's exodus as a clear retreat, and temporarily succeeded in
stalling his troops.~
By 1931, it became increasingly clear that the National
Guard, even with u.s. support, faltered in its attempts to
contain let a~one destroy sandino. 59

Coinciding with this, the

United states Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson, announced
plans in 1931 to reduce the number of Marines from 1,500 men, to
500 men. The policy of withdrawing the Marines accelerated in
1932 when Franklin D. Roosevelt became president of the United
States, and initiated his "Good Neighbor Policy," with a promise
to refrain from intervention and interference in Latin
America. 60
On January 1, 1933, a Liberal President, Juan B. Sacasa
became president of Nicaragua.

In addition, Sacasa's nephew-in

law, General Anastasio Somoza Garcia took over his new post as
Jefe Director (commander) of the National Guard.
the last U.s. Marines left the country.

The next day,

In six years 132 Marines

died in action, a figure less than the total number of

•
•I
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Sandinistas killed in a single battle at ocotal. 61
After the Marines left, on February 2, 1933, Sandino flew to
Managua to meet with Sacasa.

That same night, Sacasa and Sandino

signed a peace settlement in which Sandino ended his war.
addition, Sandino agreed to gradually turn in his arms.

In
In

return, the Sandinistas received full amnesty, a tract of land to
form an agricultural colony, permission to retain an army of 100
men, and a promise that the Sandinistas would be given employment
preference on all public works projects in the North. 62

The war

officially ended.
Not everyone liked the settlement.

Somoza was furious that

Sacasa had granted Sandino any concessions.
Sandino had

s~ashed

Somoza believed that

away the majority of his weapons for future

use against the National

Guard.~

Tensions between Sandino and

Somoza increased when Sandino (who had now retired to his
agricultural colony) began proclaiming that the National Guard
was unconstitutional, and refused to surrender his weapons.

As

the end of Sacasa's term approached, a power struggle emerged
between Sandino and Somoza. M
Somoza then launched a plan to arrest and kill Sandino.

He

informed his conspirators that they had full support from the
U.S. 65

On February 21, 1934, as he left President Sacasa's

house after a dinner, Guardsmen kidnapped sandino, his father,
and two of his aides.
and shot him to

The Guardsmen took Sandino to an airfield,

death.~

The assassination of Sandino helped solidify Somoza's

•
•
•
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control over the National Guard, ultimately leading to his
control of the country.

First, he not only eliminated a possible

political rival, but also gained support from the Guard, which
hated Sandino.

In addition, Somoza openly encouraged the

Guardsmen to take part in widespread corruption.

This action

further isolated the Guard from the citizens of Nicaragua, making
them as dependent on Somoza as he was on them. 67

THE RISE TO POWER OF ANASTASIO SOMOZA GARCIA

Anastasio Somoza Garcia was the son of a well-to-do coffee
grower.

Known as "Tacho," Somoza had been educated in the United

states, where he met and married Salvadora Debayle (Juan Sacasa's
niece).

He

r~turned

in the civil war.~

to Nicaragua in 1926, to help the Liberals
Following the assassination of sandino,

Somoza consolidated and tightened his grip over the National'
Guard, and began his ascent to power.
By the end of 1934, Somoza finally admitted that he had
ordered the assassination of Sandino, something strongly believed
anyway.

Somoza also announced that he intended to run for

president in 1936.

Somoza was never prosecuted for his first

admission, and his desire to become president remained in danger
because the Nicaraguan Constitution banned him on two counts;
a relative to the current president and as Jefe Director of the
National Guard, a supposedly a-political

force.~

Somoza

assured Arthur Bliss Lane, the U.s. Minister in Nicaragua,
however, that he "would take no violent action whatever against

as
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President Sacasa..

,,70

Lane, however, was very skeptical

because Somoza also promised not kill Sandino.
By May of 1935, Somoza began campaigning for President even
though the Nicaraguan Constitution forbade any such activity
until six months prior to a Presidential election.

Sacasa began

placing responsibility on the united states because they had
created the National Guard, and now Somoza was using its power to
disobey the Constitution.

Minister Lane believed that the u.s.

might possibly consider some course of action noting "I am
prepared to admit that the United states' prestige may suffer in
Latin America temporarily should Somoza become president. 1171
Somoza began to take advantage of the united states' policy of
non-intervention.
Somoza had to deal with the Constitutional barriers
preventing him from becoming President.

He maintained control of

the Guard and possessed the militarily ability to take over, but
he would not be seen as the legitimate president.

Somoza planned

to have a constituent assembly called to elect him provisional
president.

Sacasa informed the U.s. that this was

unconstitutional and hoped the united states would not recognize
Somoza in such a scenario.

Lane replied by simply stating that

the U.s. did not consider options which had not yet happened. n
By August of 1935, Somoza made it clear that he definitely
intended on being the next president, and told Lane that "there
was nobody in Nicaragua who could prevent it." 73

Lane informed

Cordell Hull, now the U.s. Secretary of State, that if any
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obstacle impeded Somoza, "he could not, in my opinion, be
depended upon to keep his word, many times given to me, that he
would not use violence."~ Somoza realized that attempts to
legitimize his campaign stalled, so he determined to simply take
the presidency.
By late september, the situation in Nicaragua began to reach
a crisis level.

Lane discovered that members of the National

Guard planned to demand Sacasa's resignation, but at the last
minute, Somoza stopped the Guardsmen.~ On the other side, the
Executive committee of the Liberal Party, along with several
Nicaraguan municipalities, demanded that Sacasa order Somoza to
resign.~

Sacasa knew that Somoza aspired to take his job, but

he also knew that the forced resignation of Somoza would lead to
a civil war.

Once again he pleaded for U.S. assistance, citing

the fact that the Americans had created the Guard.

Lane informed

him of the U.s.' refusal to intervene in the crisis. n
By February of 1936, a gas crisis engulfed Nicaragua.

A mob

consisting of chauffeurs and other workers had taken to the
streets. 78

Sacasa believed that the Guard had instigated the

movement by the chauffeurs for political reasons. This indeed may
be true as many members of the mob called for Somoza to take over
as President of Nicaragua.~
The gas crisis demonstrated how powerless Sacasa was.
Somoza controlled the only force in Nicaragua with the capability
to quell the riot, and thus Sacasa remained at his mercy.
result, in May of 1936, Sacasa sent a personal letter to

As a
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Washington explaining his situation, and blaming the United
states.

Sacasa wrote that since Somoza took control of the

National Guard, "he has been usurping the functions which belong
to me, as Commander in Chief of the Army, disregarding orders
emanating from my authority. 1180

He went on to say that he had

no military support to defend his legitimately elected government
and without assistance from the united states, "blood will
probably be shed, anarchy will reign • • • and latent communism •
• • will find a favorable field in which to develop. • • • ,,81
Once again the u.s. cited its policy of non-intervention, and
non-interference in the region and refused assistance.

By the

end of May, the revolution was in full swing, and Somoza's forces
had possession of the electric light plant, and all strategic
buildings in Leon. 82
By the end of May 1936, somoza's men controlled virtually
all of Managua and Leon.

Thus on June 9, 1936, Sacasa and Vice

President Espinosa resigned their posts. M

Somoza in a move to

"legitimize" his power, called for December elections, Which he
easily won. M

The Somoza dynasty was born.

Historian Richard Millett writes that, "The major share of
the responsibility for Somoza's seizure of power •
with the United states. ,,85

must rest

The United states left Nicaragua

with the National Guard to police the country.

When Somoza began

to use this institution to gain power, the U.s. did nothing to
stop him.

Without the U.S., Sacasa remained helpless to defend

his regime, and Somoza took over.
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A DYNASTY TAKES OVER - FROM SOMOZA I TO SOMOZA III

Anastasio Somoza Garcia ruled from 1936-1956.

He

implemented a formula to maintain control, which comprised of
three objectives:

maintaining support of the National Guard, co

opting important domestic power contenders, and cultivating the
Americans. u

This last ingredient meant basically doing

everything the U.S. asked, to the point where "The Ambassador
ranked as the second most powerful man in the country, and, at
times, as the most powerful. ,,87

On the night of September 20,

1956 a young poet, Rigoberto Lopez, shot Somoza four times.

U.S.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower flew in several American
physicians, but Somoza still
The

assa~sination

died.~

did not kill the dynasty.

With the death

of his father, Luis Somoza automatically seized the presidency,
while his brother Anastasio Somoza Garcia II used the National
Guard to assure that any political opponents stayed out of the
way.~

Luis promoted such programs as pUblic housing and

education, social security, and agrarian

reforms.~

The U.S.

under John F. Kennedy and his Alliance for Progress sent more aid
to Nicaragua.

The Alliance, however, ended up hurting Nicaraguan

citizens, because the government put the money into projects
which benefitted the oligarchy.

Cotton fields replaced grain

fields, and the Nicaraguans began to "lose their capacity to feed
themselves. ,,91

The situation grew worse, and by 1967 a new

guerilla organization, the National Sandinista Liberation Front
(FSLN or Sandinistas) began operations in revolt against the
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government.

In 1961, the group had adopted the name of the

country's most famous nationalist hero, and their actions
eventually led to the collapse of the Somoza dynasty in 1979. 92
Following his brother's death in 1967, Anastasio Somoza
Garcia II became the third, and last Somoza to rule Nicaragua.
He differed from his brother in that he relied heavily on
military power to protect his rule.

In addition, he replaced the

skilled technicians, (which Luis placed in charge of the economy)
with his friends who lacked economic skills.~
The election of Richard Nixon to the White House, pleased
Somoza.

Nixon and Somoza both saw the Communist threat in the

hemisphere the same way, and neither wanted to see it spread.
Nixon undertook a visit to Latin America in 1958, in which the
then Vice-President encountered hostile demonstrations protesting
his visit.

Nicaragua did not greet him with such hostility, -and

so he "considered Somoza a firm American ally, deserving of all
possible support. ,,94

Nixon named Turner Shelton as Ambassador

to Nicaragua, and he and Somoza soon became friends. 95

From

Nixon, the Somoza dynasty enjoyed a relationship in which
Washington granted its fullest support and favor.

In April of

1971, the Nixons entertained Somoza at a private dinner, while in
1972 Somoza contributed one-mill ion-dollars to the Nixon
campaign.%

In his autobiography, Somoza related of Nixon that

"I consider myself his friend.

,,97

While he enjoyed a "good time" abroad, internally Somoza's
support deteriorated.

In 1971 Somoza's term came to an end.

Of
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course he wanted to stay in power, so he reached a political
agreement with his former rival, Fernando Aguerro.

Under this

agreement, a three-man-junta of Aguerro, and two Somoza
representatives assumed power. 106

In theory, Somoza no longer

held power, but the appearances deceived no one.
This plan suffered attack from two sources.

The church

issued a statement indicating that it wanted to see a whole new
system, and that this new government merely reenforced Somoza's
hold on the country. 107
Joaquin Chamorro.

The second attack came from Pedro

Chamorro, through his newspaper LaPrensa, (the

leading opposition newspaper of Somoza in Nicaragua) insisted
that Somoza would still rule through the use of the National
Guard.

Furthermore, Chamorro believed that Somoza simply planned

on running again for President in

1974.1~

DEVASTATION AND CORRUPTION - THE 1972 EARTHQUAKE

On December 23, 1972, disaster strUCk.

The city of Managua

shook, the result of a devastating earthquake which ravaged the
city.

within minutes, the city lay in shambles.

death toll reached ten-thousand people.

The official

An additional twenty

thousand suffered injuries, and three-hundred-thousand people of
Managua found themselves homeless. 109

Reflecting on the

situation Somoza declared the situation "the worst moment in the
history of Nicaragua ,,110
Immediately following the earthquake, the U.S. pledged full
support.

Nixon phoned Somoza, and informed him that the U.S.
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planned to put forth an all-out effort to aid Nicaragua.

Medical

supplies, bulldozers, and other items arrived at a tonnage
Somoza, of course, thanked the u.s. declaring that
'"
Nicaragua would "always be grateful for the aid which came from
rate.

so many countries, and particularly the United states of
America. ,,112
In the days following the earthquake, chaos and corruption
ran rampant.

The National Guard, who had the duty of maintaining

stability, left in search of their families.

On their way, the

guardsmen proceeded to loot automobile dealerships, and appliance
shops while ignoring pleas for help. 113

Somoza later claimed

that only some looting took place by a few officers, but this was
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by no means the norm (emphasis added). 114 .The people of
Nicaragua saw things differently. In addition, the food sent by
the United states remained at the airport away from the hungry
and homeless.

Not until four days after the earthquake did food

begin to be distributed. 115
While Managua suffered from the earthquake, Somoza profited
handsomely.

The United states sent thirty-two-million dollars in

government funds, plus over one-hundred-thousand dollars from
private sources.

Of this, the Nicaraguan Treasury accounted for

only sixteen-million-dollars. '16
of the money went.
$400 million. '17

No one doubts where the rest

In 1974 one estimate placed Somoza's worth at

Somoza argued that some people "claimed that

international relief was exploited for my own personal gain.
Nothing could be further from the truth." 118

...

I

I
I

I
I
I
I
I
I
I

II

I
I

-I
II

II

.

26

Somoza also profited from other aspects of the rebuilding
process.

He and his cronies decided where all of the new housing

and buildings were built.

He invested in demolition, earth

moving, heavy equipment, construction materials, real estate, and
housing.

Somoza had a hand in every aspect of the rebuilding

process, and "His greed and his willingness to take advantage of
his compatriots' suffering seemed boundless.,,119
Somoza's actions during the crisis alienated the citizens of
Nicaragua.

Because he virtually ignored the business class, they

became enraged at Somoza to the point where the "'social
contract' between the Somozas and the independent businessmen had
been broken.,,120
positioned

The press highlighted the rage.

me~ers

One report

of Somoza's relief team, hungry, thirsty, and

tired around his pool while he ate a three-course-meal, offering
them nothing, not even a glass of water. 121
During the crisis, Somoza once again assumed power.

In

1974, an election occurred, and of course Somoza won by a

landslide.

This election did not go without protest, as Pedro

Joaquin Chamorro, and twenty-six other Opposition leaders signed
a petition declaring that both Somoza, and his opponent (who
Somoza hand picked to oppose him) should be disqualified on
constitutional grounds.

This motion failed to move the Electoral

Tribune which rejected it. 122

On August 31, 1974, the day

before the election, in a sadly humorous move, LaPrensa ran a
headline titled: "Candidates who won tomorrow's election.,,123
Upon election, Somoza revised the Constitution, ensuring his rule

27
until 1981.
On December 27, 1974, the Sandinistas struck back.

They

raided a dinner party and kidnapped several individuals of the
government.

The group demanded one-million-dollars in ransom,

the release of Sandinista prisoners, a pUblic broadcast and
pUblishing of a message from the F.S.L.N. to the people of
Nicaragua, and a plane to take them to Cuba.
with all of these demands. 124

Somoza complied

Somoza had underestimated the

strength of the F.S.L.N., and in a fit of rage, declared a state
of siege.

This raid by the Sandinistas led Somoza to employ sick

violations of human rights, (which will be discussed later) in
which the National Guard sought to destroy the F.S.L.N.

By 1976,

Nicaragua displayed an increasingly "impoverished, divided,
corrupt. repressed, and angry society. ,,125

HUMAN RIGHTS AND POLICY WRONGS -- THE CARTER
ADMINISTRATION TAKES OVER

When Carter took office in 1977, he placed human rights at
the center of his foreign policy.

Raised in the South, Carter

saw firsthand the travesty of racism.

He drew on this experience

in placing human rights on his agenda, declaring that the United
states "has been strongest and most effective when morality and a
commitment to freedom and democracy have been most clearly
emphasized in our foreign policy. ,,126

Carter saw human rights

as the most effective way to deal with totalitarian ideologies.
He criticized past Administrations under which "military
dictators were immune from any criticism of their oppressive
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actions. ,,127
In a speech aimed at oppressive dictators, Carter ordered to
"'Give your people freedom to worship, to express themselves, to
shape their own destiny, to vote, to live in peace, and to live
in freedom.' ,,128

Speaking on behalf of Carter, Deputy Secretary

of State Warren Christopher promised concentrated attention to
the "violations of integrity • • • officially sanctioned murders,
tortures, and detentions without trial. ,,129

Carter wanted a

tough human rights policy.
Somoza exhibited all of the ugly traits which Carter pledged
to work against.

In June of 1976, hearings took place before the

House of Representatives, Subcommittee on International
Organizations~

The issue at hand -- human rights abuses.

Nicaragua failed miserably.

An exiled Nicaraguan historian,

Edelberto Torres, reported several abuses by Somoza.
included: rapes of women, castrations of men,

These,

application of

electric prods, karate chops to the stomach, and when the victim
"vomits blood they force him to clean the floor with his tongue,"
mechanical extraction of the nails one by one, and finally, being
thrown from a helicopter. 130

The House Report also included

testimony that political prisoners experienced "innovative"
tortures, such as electric shocks, fractured eardrums, pulled
teeth, being hung from the testicles, having acid poured on them,
and being forced to stand for nine days. 131

These tortures

awaited political prisoners, and by 1976, the Somoza regime
desperately needed reform.
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During the Carter Years (1977-1980) Nicaragua did not
represent the only event in foreign policy.

In fact several

other situations took precedent in foreign policy.

Carter and

the Soviets held negotiations to consider the second strategic
Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II), deemed crucial for arms
reduction in the Cold War.

In addition the United states talked

with the People's Republic of China in order to restore formal
diplomatic relations with that country, and to break ties with
Nationalist China.

Carter also conducted the Middle East Peace

Talks between Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime
Minister Menachem Begin at Camp David, which provided the
framework for "peace" in the Middle East.

In Africa, the Cubans

became involved in the Horn of Africa, and conflicts in Southern
Rhodesia escalated.

The Soviets invaded Afghanistan, and the

Iranian conflict erupted into a revolution.

Most important to

Carter personally, the United states conducted talks with Panama
in order to transfer the rights of the canal to that country.

In

short, the Presidency of Jimmy Carter witnessed several crucial
events in terms of foreign policy.
The Carter Administration had little time for Nicaragua at
the beginning of its term.

The early U.s. approach to Nicaragua

consisted of general policies, formulated for foreign policy in
general, and then applied to Nicaragua for specific
circumstances. 132

concerning Latin American Policy, three of

Carter's themes affected Nicaragua.

First, Carter's commitment

to new canal treaties with Panama meant making concerns of small

•
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Central American countries u.s. concerns.

Carter did not want

the region to erupt, thus jeopardizing the treaties.

Second,

Carter adamantly opposed overthrowing, or for that matter
interfering at all, with any established government.

Finally, a

third theme provided for the protection of human rights. 1n
These last two themes, non-interference, and human rights,
eventually clashed, as the Somoza regime grew increasingly
brutal.

Obvious contradictions exist in forcing a regime to

abide by human rights, while not interfering in the country.

For

Carter, however, the beginning of his term saw a relatively
stable Nicaragua, and thus this conflict did not yet show.

On

January 10, 1978, Carter and the u.S. saw the Nicaraguan
situation explode.

THE CHAMORRO ASSASSINATION - NICARAGUA TAKES CENTER
STAGE

Lake points out that the assassination of Chamorro demanded
the attention of the seventh floor of the State Department, or
rather, "the Seventh Floor, for this is where the power
resides. ,,134 While some people claim that Somoza knew nothing
about the assassination, evidence that he indeed knew exists.
Just as his father did after the assassination of sandino, Somoza
claimed no knowledge of the plot, and he even produced
"suspects."
The rivalry between the Chamorros and the Somozas dated back
to the late nineteenth century.

As mentioned earlier, Pedro

Joaquin's grandfather defeated Somoza's great uncle for the

,
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rights of Presidency.

In 1926, Chamorro's father founded

LaPrensa, for the express reason of publishing opposition against
the elder Somoza.
Pedro Joaquin, and Anastasio Somoza II, knew each other from
grammar school.

The two engaged in many fights stemming from

Pedro Joaquin's criticism of Somoza's father, but Somoza claims
that "Chamorro never bested me.

Psychologically, I think, the

results . • • stayed with him all of his life.,,13s
not Somoza never lost remains to be seen.

Whether or

The conflict

nevertheless continued into adulthood.
Chamorro continued the opposition that his father started,
and often found himself in trouble with the government.

In 1954,

the elder Somoza jailed Chamorro for rebelling against the
government.

Chamorro found himself banished from Managua for

forty months in 1956 for publishing photos of the assassination
of the elder Somoza.

Chamorro led a rebellion in 1959 against

the National Guard which resulted once again in his jailing. 136
Ouring the earthquake crisis, LaPrensa exposed the corruption of
the Somoza regime, and in 1977 the paper's sympathetic coverage
of the Sandinistas led to censorship, and a ban on Chamorro
leaving the country.

Although he found many enemies within the

government, chamorro seemed too prominent to kill.
Somoza hated Chamorro.

By 1977, Chamorro resembled "an

encyclopedia of Somoza's sins. ,,137

Somoza complained that

Chamorro misrepresented facts and distorted truths to suit his
fancy, and furthermore that he printed lies. 138

Norman Wolfson

--
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who Somoza employed for pUblic relations, notes that "Somoza
didn't like Chamorro.

Anyone who was called names and insulted •

. • everyday of the week and still liked the man would be a
freak.

,,139

Everyone demanded that Chamorro's killers be brought to
justice.
question:

Somoza claims his initial reaction centered on the
"Who could have committed this murder?

thing for certain:

I knew one

No one connected with me or my administration

had been involved. ,,140

Everyone, of course suspected Somoza,

but he was shocked that people's "first inclination was that,
through some means, I was involved in the death of Chamorro. ,,141
Only one day after the murder, Somoza announced the arrests
of four suspects.

Luis Pallais, a cousin of Somoza, informed him

that a reporter knew the identity of the assassin.

The reporter

I
I

told Pallais that a man, Silvio Pena, approached him with the

-I

vindicate Somoza.

news that he planned on killing Chamorro. 142
Several problems with this story implicate rather than
First of all, the reporter whom Pena told this

story worked for Novedades, the Somoza owned newspaper.

Why

i

would Somoza not have been told of this plan to kill Chamorro?
Somoza claims that he always worried "about his [Chamorro's]
safety that I recall thinking this man should have security
protection. ,,143

Either Somoza knew about the assassination, or

he possessed incredible investigational skills.

The latter

assumption proves suspect when Wolfson recalls that he was "not
impressed that within hours after the • • • murder, suspects were
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arrested and [had] confessed.,,144
told the

Chamorro's widow, Violetta,

New York Times, that "The Government claims that the

case has been solved, but I hold Somoza responsible because no
one does anything without permission from above. ,,145
According to Somoza, Chamorro's exposes of a blood bank
operated by Pena led to his death.

Laprensa reported that the

Plasmaferisis blood bank bought the blood of impoverished
Nicaraguans for $5.25 a pint, and sold it abroad for enormous
profits. 146

Somoza states that "In reality what killed Chamorro

was his extreme attack on Dr. Ramos [owner of Plasmaferisis].
,,147

Once again, however, Somoza implicates himself.

In a

1977 interview, Chamorro told the New York Times, that Somoza

"definitely ha;s interests in that company" [Plasmaferisis]. 148
Any possible documentation of this claim went up in smoke when
the building burned down.

The Government blamed the fire on

"communist gangs," but witnesses said that it appeared to start
inside the building, and not as a result of protestors' fire
bombs. 149
Somoza made the suspects testify on television and on radio
to distance them from the government.

Interestingly, Pena's

attorney and brother , Renaldo Pena Rivas, claimed that the
confessions resulted from torture.

He also maintained that a

witness who could prove Pena's innocence, had been silenced by
death threats. 150
In his memoirs, Robert Pastor side-steps the assassination
of Chamorro.

He does not express his opinion explicitly.

Too
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much evidence against Somoza exists, however, to eradicate him
completely from knowledge of the assassination.

The

assassination led to a nationwide strike in Nicaragua, a virtual
civil war, and finally, the resignation of Somoza.

Chamorro's

assassination also caused a watershed for American foreign
policy.

Carter was forced to the examine the problems of

Nicaragua personally.

POLICY CLASHES - HOMAN RIGHTS VS. THE COLD WAR

Prior to Chamorro's death, contradictions in Carter's
Foreign Policy began to show.

As mentioned earlier, hearings

held in 1976 on human rights abuses demonstrated the atrocities
committed by Somoza and the National Guard.
the hearings clarified that "a change in

The conclusion of

u.s. policy toward that

regime [Somoza] is crucial to the success of democratic forces in
Nicaragua. ,,151

In early 1978, that change did not occur.

Following the 1976 hearings, the human rights organization
Amnesty International, blasted Nicaraguan abuses in August of
1976.

The report cited extensive torture, executions, political

imprisonment, and other violations of the National Guard,
including the disappearance of over 300 peasants.

One assumes

that this report, coupled with the 1976 hearings, might result in
strict regulations toward Nicaragua.

The opposite happened.

In

September, the State Department agreed to a $2.5 million arms
credit agreement, and approved of $15.1 million in economic aid
for 1978,

The Nicaraguan opposition quickly pointed out that
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Somoza in the past decade received

twenty-million-dollars in

military aid - the highest per capita allotment in the area. 152
These figures together with the fact that the U.S. still trained
the Nicaraguan National Guard, which committed these abuses,
showed the hypocrisy of Carter's policy.
By January of 1978, disagreement among Carter's policy
makers eventually led to even more inconsistencies.
Department consists of several divisions of bureaus.

The state
Under

Carter, the director of the Latin American bureau's Office of
Central American Affairs was Wade Matthews, while Patricia Derian
headed the human rights bureau.

These two bureaus constantly

argued over policy towards Nicaragua.

The human rights bureau

tried to make;policy on a country by country basis, while the
Latin American bureau looked more at the full range of relations
in the Western Hemisphere.
The battle lines divided into two parties:
career officers.

career and non

To the career officers, those in the human

rights bureau saw problems through the idealistic lens of human
rights.

Career officers wanted a more realistic approach, based

on an increase in intervention.

The human rights bureau charged

that promotion drove the career officers, and pursuing human
rights involved friction, angry voices, and interference with
routine aid packages which could jeopardize political careers.
The system also inherently demanded that all those involved with
a certain topic be allowed to see any document, and offer any
objections where their interests conflict. 153
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Adding to the gridlock, two agencies exist in policy making,
the state Department and the National security council (NSC).
The NSC advises the President on national security matters.

In

addition the NSC must coordinate policy, do long-term planning,
and ensure the implementation of the President's policies.

Under

Carter, zbigniew Brzezinski held the position of National
Security Advisor.

Robert Pastor served under him.

The Secretary

of State, Cyrus Vance, also employed help, and this task went to
Under Secretary Warren Christopher.

As if the system did not

inherently cause enough competition, the personalities of Vance
and Brzezinski conflicted.

Brzezinski differed from Vance in

that he saw every event in terms of its implications in the Cold
War.

This difzerence eventually resulted in numerous policy

mishaps.
Following Chamorro's death, Nicaragua experienced a mass
strike, as the business class for the first time rose up against
Somoza.

Midway through the strike, the Sandinistas launched

another offensive, and although their effort failed to overthrow
Somoza, they nonetheless demonstrated that Somoza's hold wavered.
Somoza once again responded by sending out the National Guard.
Following Pedro Joaquin's funeral, the citizens began marching in

~
I

the street, and eventually clashes broke out with the National
Guard.

The guard responded by firing machine guns into the

crowd.

A report by a Nicaraguan priest, Miguel D'Escoto, told

,

I
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the State Department that the National Guard continued to carry
out "widespread murder, torture, and rape • • • " and that
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"peaceful women demonstrators in Managua were beaten with metal
chains..

,,154

Once again proof existed of the atrocities of the Somoza
regime, and once again Washington responded in a contradictory
manner.

On May 16, 1978 the washington Post ran a story

headlined:
Nicaragua."

"U.S. Alters Stand On Rights, Frees Aid to
John Goshgo, the Post's Correspondent in Nicaragua,

reported that the Carter administration cleared for release
twelve-million-dollars, which "had been held up for human rights
reasons."

Even though reports of atrocities continued to come in

about Nicaragua, the administration nevertheless released twelve
million more dollars to a regime it continually chastised for
human rights abuses.

Augmenting this aid, evidence surfaced that

two weeks prior to this release the State Department secretly
released $160,000 in military credits to cover equipment needed
by the National Guard for a mil i tary hospital. 155

The

administration preached one policy, but followed another.
The May aid release indicated the real motives behind
Carter's Foreign Policy.

One of the reasons this aid passed,

involved other aid to other countries.

Congressman Charles

Wilson (D-Tex), a pro-Somoza voice in congress, indicated that if
the Nicaraguan aid did not go through, he planned on using his
influence to sponsor legislation cutting off aid to at least six
other countries, inclUding Panama, and most of Africa.

I

Senior

officials decided that the Somoza issue "had to take a clear
second place to preventing serious damage to our world wide aid
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program ... 156

To the administration, Nicaragua did not

constitute enough of a problem to sacrifice other interests.
During this same time, Somoza increased u.s. fears about
communism. In his book Somoza states that he continually told the
"state Department . • • the President, the Congress and the
American people . . . that the Sandinista movement was
communist ... 157

He also tried to portray the entire Chamorro

family as communist, and thus their association with the
Sandinistas proved his allegations. 158

The Sandinistas launched

an offensive in October of 1977, and then again in January of
1978, leading many "Cold Warriors" to believe that a Somoza
overthrow would lead to a communist replacement.
remembered

tha~

It must be

Carter's National Security Advisor, Brzezinski,

saw events in terms of how they affected u.S. - Soviet relations,
and this affected policy decisions.

The May release demonstrated

the inconsistencies of human rights and the Carter
administration's actual policies, but more damage occurred one
month later.

SENDING THE WRONG SIGNALS - THE CARTER LETTER

I

I

At the end of June, 1978, Brzezinski sent Pastor a
memorandum informing him that Carter wanted to send a letter to

r

•
t
•

Somoza, encouraging him for improvements in human rights.

During

a June 19 press conference, Somoza pledged to improve human
rights.

He promised to allow the Inter-American Human Rights

Commission come to investigate Nicaragua.

In addition, he

I

I
I
I
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pledged to allow back into the country the Group of Twelve (a
group of businessmen exiled for their opposition to Somoza).
Somoza also promised to consider Carter's proposal of granting
amnesty for political prisoners (Somoza never did any of

I

this) . 159

~

wishes to send a letter, and Brzezinski gave the duty of drafting

carter read these promises and wanted to encourage

,.

K

Somoza to follow up on them.

Carter informed Brzezinski of his

the letter to Pastor.
Pastor did not like the idea of sending a letter to Somoza.
When Pastor protested to Brzezinski, he cut him off, telling him
to "'write it.
State.,,,160

Put your concerns in the memo and clear it with

Pastor recommended against sending the letter for

two reasons.

He cited the fact that Somoza did not have a good

record of keeping promises, and second, he feared that Somoza
would use the letter for his own advantage.
these warnings.

Brzezinski ignored

Lake claims, he "did not want to oppose the

state Department on what he saw as a relatively minor matter when
he was fighting it on • . .

policy in the Horn of Africa, ,,161

A reference to Cuba's presence in Ethiopia.
Mark Schneider of the Human Rights bureau in the state
Department also opposed sending a letter to Somoza.

When he

found out about the letter, Schneider "went through the
roof ." 162

Schneider believed that Somoza would publicize the

letter in order to improve his personal standing around the
world.

Both the Latin American, and Human Rights bureaus in the

State Department, along with Pastor, the chief NSC expert in the

r

t

I
l
I

I
I
I
I
I,

,

I
I

I
I

I
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region, objected to sending the letter, but Brzezinski deleted
all warnings to carter.

President Carter did not know that the

two bureaus in the state Department with the most knowledge on
Nicaragua, and a NSC policy expert, opposed the idea of sending
the letter.

Brzezinski served his own interests at the expense

of Carter's.
This did not end the opposition.

Pastor later wrote another

memorandum to Brzezinski about the dangers of sending this
letter.

He warned that Somoza's promises about human rights

should not be translated into real actions.

He also added that

because of the united states's historical relationship with
Somoza, any act that even appeared to support him, could
antagonize the opposition in Nicaragua.1~ Once again
Brzezinski ignored his memorandum.
In early July, the National Guard shot and killed twenty-six
students on a hunger strike to protest the holding of political
prisoners.

Despite the enormity of the recent violation, on July

21, the U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua, Mauricio Solaun, still
delivered the letter to Somoza praising him for his human rights
pledges.

In the letter, Carter

told Somoza that "The steps

toward respecting human rights that you are considering are
important and heartening signs..

"Carter ended the letter

by expressing his appreciation of Somoza's promises for
"constructive actions. ,,164
Just as the opponents of the letter had warned, Somoza tried
to use the letter for his own personal benefit.

In his

_

_

~-=

..

.<i.'~"'''''''''''

"

: ,

I
;'

'\""

.

,.~

'{

."',

"'-

'"

~

I
_

41

autobiography, Somoza proclaims:

"I was not interested in a

collector's item and, without being able to use the letter
' 1 y, th a t' s what
publ 1.C

1.' twas.

,,165

Somoza proceeded to arrange a

meeting with his critic, Venezuelan President Carlos Andrez
Perez, and revealed to him the contents of the letter.

This

proved to be a crucial blunder and caused great embarrassment for
Carter who considered Perez as one of his best personal friends.
In February, Carter had pledged to work closely with Perez on the
issue of human rights in Nicaragua.

Now Perez found out from

Somoza, the greatest abuser of human rights in Latin America,
that Carter had sent him a letter encouraging him for human
rights.

Carter did not receive the warnings from his aides

because Brzezinski deleted them from all of the memorandums.
This did not bode well for Perez's trust of

Carter.1~

Carter's problem did not end with Perez.

A state Department

Official leaked the contents of the letter to the press.

On

August 1, the Post reported that "Carter Letter to Somoza Stirs
Human-Rights Row."

More than ever the rift in the state

Department turned into pUblic knowledge.

The article reported

that the letter caused deep concern within the State Department,
because Carter sent it at a time when reported increases in
abuses of human rights, further implicated Somoza.

The article

went on to quote unnamed officials who regarded "the timing of
Carter's letter as a case of sending Somoza the wrong signal at
the wrong time. ,,167

In addition to the Washington Post, the New

York Times also covered the story, with the headline, "Carter

I
I

I

I
I

~
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Said To Overrule Aides to Praise

Somoza."1~

The leak to the press further embarrassed Carter.

People

saw his administration embroiled in contradiction, while his
foreign policy seemed misguided.

Human rights activists quickly

pointed out the contradictions of the administration towards
Nicaragua.

Not only did the letter cause several rifts for

Carter, but more importantly for the future, it angered the
Sandinistas who still despised the u.S. for its intervention at
the turn of the century.
Why was the letter allowed to be sent?

By August of 1978,

Somoza made it clear that he refused to step down from power
until 1981, the next scheduled election.

This determination

coupled with the increased strength of the Sandinistas, led many
in the administration (particularly Brzezinski) to believe that
Somoza represented the only acceptable alternative to
Sandinistas.

A DYNASTY ENDS - THE SANDXNXSTAS AND THE FALL OF SOMOZA

In October of 1978, the Organization of American states
(OAS) under the supervision of the United States, organized a
mediation effort between representatives from the Sandinistas,
Somoza, and the OAS.

The Sandinista representatives called for

Somoza's immediate resignation.

Somoza, through his

representatives, demanded that he be allowed to finish his term,
while the OAS proposed that Somoza resign, and hand power over to
a junta that would include-members from Somoza's party and the
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National

Guard.1~

The Sandinistas rejected this mediation, and

Somoza's refusal to resign led to the collapse of the talks in
January of 1979.
The u.s. obviously controlled the OAS proposals.

The Carter

administration created this proposal which totally excluded the
Sandinistas from any possible interim government.

More

frightening, however, the Carter administration proposed to leave
the National Guard intact, the same guard who time after time,
carried out some of the most gross violations of human rights in
history.

For the Carter administration, the threat of communism

began to supersede human rights considerations.
Unfortunately, Nicaraguan citizens continued to suffer.

In

November of 19;78, an OAS group reported that the National Guard
continued indiscriminate bombing of civilians, summary and mass
executions, as well as other tortures.

A women in Nicaragua

related a horrifying story about the killings.

The woman

recalled low flying planes which started firing at the civilians,
and struck her daughter.

When the woman looked, she "saw only

the heart and intestines of my daughter.
pieces, destroyed.,,1ro

She was broken in

As the Sandinista offensive against

Somoza increased, so too did the atrocities of the National
Guard.
Even with another report of violations, the U.s. once again
reversed its policy and aided Somoza.

In February, the Post

reported that the administration planned on cutting off relations
with Nicaragua, but instead decided to employ less drastic

I

l
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measures.

Sanctions, basically cutting the staff at the embassy

in half, simply resulted in "an ineffective slap on the wrist . .
"

The mild sanction resulted from pressure from Congress,

spearheaded again by Charles Wilson, who threatened to hold up
the Panama Canal treaties, and cut aid to other countries if
Carter broke off relations with Nicaragua. 171

The Carter

administration was hand-cuffed in Nicaragua because of other
interests.
William LeoGrande points out that Washington Intelligence
sources predicted that the National Guard could defeat any
Sandinista offensive.

Thus, a Somoza government until 1981

looked more attractive to Washington than any situation involving
the Sandinistas. 1n

Consistent with this argument, the

administration again aided the dictator by reversing an earlier
decision, and allowing a $66 million International Monetary Fund
(IMF) loan for Nicaragua without any objection. 1n
The administration's predictions proved incorrect.

In June

of 1979, the Sandinistas launched a "final offensive" against
Somoza.

Any chance for a final push of U.S. support exploded on

June 20, 1979, as ABC television correspondent Bill Stewart, was
forced to his knees by a National Guard soldier, and shot in cold
blood through the head.

Unbeknownst to the soldier, Stewart's

camera crew filmed the entire incident.

The U.S. saw on

television for the first time what Nicaraguans had endured for
over forty years.

This video "did more to injure Somoza's

reputation around the world, even among conservatives, than
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perhaps any single incident in the decades-long family rule. 1I
Finally convinced that Somoza's days were nUmbered, the u.s.
called for an emergency meeting of the OAS.

The purpose was to

try and impose a moderate solution, and avoid a Sandinista
takeover.

The u.s. proposed the creation of an interim

government, an OAS peacekeeping force, and an international
relief effort.

The OAS rejected the administration's proposal,

calling for Somoza's immediate resignation, a democratic
government composed of representatives from the opposition
groups, and free elections.

The Sandinista junta (which included

Velleity Chamorro, the widow of Pedro Joaquin) approved the
resolution.1~

On July 17, 1979, Somoza fled, thus ending the

forty-five year dynasty.
When Carter assumed office, he had not exactly envisioned a
Sandinista government in Nicaragua.

Following Somoza's

overthrow, Nicaragua lay in shambles.

The economy as well as

human lives had suffered devastation.

Although Carter requested

it, Congress balked at sending immediate aid.

Congress did not

want to see another country fall to communism, as Cuba had in the
1960's.

Needing immediate aid, Nicaragua reached an agreement

with the soviet Union, which pledged assistance.

Refusing aid on

the grounds of communism, congress left Nicaragua with no other
choice, but to seek Soviet assistance.
In November of 1980, Ronald Reagan won the u.s. presidency.
Upon taking the oath of Office, one of Reagan's main priorities
included weakening the Sandinista government.

He began arming
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opposition groups, including a group known as the Contras, to
fight against the Sandinistas.
any Contra aid.

Congress eventually prohibited

This presented merely an obstacle for Reagan who

employed the CIA covertly to aid the Contras without the
knowledge of Congress or the American people.
authorized Israel to begin selling

u.s.

In 1985 Reagan

arms to Iran, for the

purpose of releasing seven American hostages.

This money for the

arms, conveniently went to feeding, clothing, and arming the
Contras, again without public knowledge.

The party ended in

1987, when Oliver North's televised confessions took place during
the Iran-Contra Affair hearings.

This did not improve U.S.

Nicaraguan relations.
Jimmy carter's Nicaragua policy was destined to fail.

He

valued human rights, yet preferred Somoza to the Sandinistas.

By

the earthquake of 1972, the Nicaraguan people began to really see
the corruption of the Somoza dynasty, which increased Sandinista
activities.

When Carter took office, however, the Sandinista

threat still was not perceived as strong enough to cause great
concern for the administration.
The watershed came with the assassination of Chamorro.

A

civil war broke out, and the strength of the Sandinistas began to
show.

Carter knew about the documented abuses of human rights,

yet his administration did not want to see Nicaragua fall to the
communists, and thus continued to aid Somoza and the National
Guard.

Besides the communist threat, congressional pressure to

cut off other aid if Nicaraguan aid ended, convinced the
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administration to simply continue aiding the dictator.

For

Carter, other issues seemed more important.
The Carter letter ended any chance for a foreign policy
based on human rights.

The letter forced the u.s. to take a

definite stance toward Nicaragua, and the increasing strength of
the Sandinistas made Somoza appear as the only acceptable option.
In addition, the letter and its subsequent leak, also confirmed
the fact that the Carter administration's foreign policy was
contradictory in that

human rights only pertained to certain

situations.
Bill stewart's murder finally convinced Washington that
Somoza had to go.

Unfortunately, thousands of Nicaraguans had

died, but it took the death of one American newsman to silence
even the pro-Somoza forces in Congress.

Yet during the mediation

talks, the Carter administration pushed for a government to
include the National Guard, the perpetrators of forty years of
human rights violations.

This ultimately demonstrates that the

foreign policy of the Carter administration towards Nicaragua was
not based on human rights, but rather on preventing a communist
government from taking power.
Lessons can be drawn from Nicaragua.

First of all,

presidents eventually pay when their experts are ignored.
this manner Brzezinski did not serve Carter well.

In

He put his own

interests ahead of Carter's, and this led to a major blunder in
policy.

Second, if the U.s. government plans on forcing a leader

out of power, it better know what to replace him with.

Carter
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did not want to see Somoza in power, but he did not provide any
acceptable alternative.
with Somoza.

When crisis erupted, Carter was stuck

Finally, understanding the history of a situation

is necessary to understand present conditions.

Prior to Carter,

the Somoza regime enjoyed forty years of support.

certain

members in congress did not want this to end, and threatened to
impede passage of legislation deemed more important to Carter if
this occurred.

Carter underestimated this force.

Maybe the united states is, as Robert Pastor's book
suggests, "Condemned to Repetition" in third world countries.
Perhaps we will continue to intervene in third-world-countries
whenever revolution occurs.

Or perhaps someday we will actually

allow a country; to decide its own fate.

After all, the prototype

for democracy is the united states, and do not our roots lie in
revolution?
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